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Article 6

CASE COMMENTS
TAX LAW-MILLER V. COMMISSIONER: DEDUCTIBILITY OF CASUALTY
LOSSES AFTER VOLUNTARY ELECTION NOT TO FILE AN INSURANCE
CLAIM

Taxpayers who suffer casualty losses may decide, for a variety
of reasons, not to file an insurance claim for recovery of those
losses.' Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a
deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 2 Consequently, the
question arises whether a taxpayer may claim a casualty loss deduction even though the taxpayer did not seek insurance reimbursement for the loss. In Miller v. Commissioner,3 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a 6-5 en banc decision, expressly
overruled its previous decision in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn 4 and
held that a taxpayer who voluntarily chooses not to file an insurance
claim for recovery of a loss could still claim a section 165
deduction. 5
Part I of this comment examines the Miller holding and its underlying rationale. Part II addresses the impact of Miller on federal
income tax law and suggests that by overruling Kentucky Utilities,
Miller changes the law regarding the deductibility of losses under
section 165 after a voluntary election not to file an insurance claim.
Part III concludes that the Sixth Circuit's literal interpretation of
section 165(a)'s language "not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise" is a significant defeat for the Internal Revenue Service.
I.

The Holding and Its Rationale

InJune 1976, Miller's friend ran Miller's boat aground causing
$842.55 worth of damage to the boat. 6 Although Miller had
purchased insurance covering his boat, he did not file a recovery
claim with his insurance company because he feared that the inI Filing a claim may pose an administrative burden or the taxipayer may fear an increase in premiums or cancellation of the policy.
2 I.R.C. § 165(a) (1982) provides:
(a) General rule
There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
3 733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1984).
4 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g, 250 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Ky. 1965). For an account of the Kentucky Utilities decision, see text accompanying notes 20-32 infra.
5 733 F.2d at 404.
6 Dixon F. Miller, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,550 (1980), vacated, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,431
(1981), aft'd, Miller v.Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1984).
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surer would cancel all his insurance policies. 7 Miller recovered
$200 from his friend, however, reducing his actual loss from the
boating accident to $642.55. 8 After applying the $100 limitation
contained in section 165(c)(3), 9 Miller claimed a $542.55 casualty
loss deduction on his 1976 federal income tax return.' 0 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction
and issued a deficiency notice to the taxpayer."
The Tax Court, relying upon Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn, 12 initially concluded that the taxpayer was not entitled to a casualty loss
3
deduction for that part of the loss that was covered by insurance'
but later reconsidered its decision in light of Hills v. Commissioner 14
15
and allowed the deduction.
On en banc review, 16 the Commissioner, relying on Kentucky
Utilities, asserted that a taxpayer could not deduct a loss for which
7 49 T.C.M. (P-H)
80,550 (1980). The taxpayer feared the insurance company
would cancel the policies covering his boat, apartment, and automobile.
8 733 F.2d at 400.
9 At the time, I.R.C. § 165(c) (1976) provided:
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such losses
arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft. A loss described
in this paragraph shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of loss to
such individual arising from each casualty, or from each theft, exceeds $100 ...
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§§ 203(a) and (b), 96 Stat. 324, 422, raised the floor for casualty loss deductions from $100
to 10% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income after applying the $100 floor to each casualty or theft.
10 733 F.2d at 400.
11 Id. at 400-01.
12 394 F.2d 631. For an account of the Kentucky Utilities decision, see text accompanying
notes 20-32 infra.
13 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,550 (1980).
14 76 T.C. 484 (1981), alid, 691 F.2d 997 (11th Cir. 1982). For an account of the Hills
decision, see note 78-82 infra and accompanying text.
15 50 T.C.M. (P-H)
81,431 (1981), vacating, 49 T.C.M. (P-H)
80,550 (1980).
Although the Tax Court in Miller indicated that the facts of both Hills and Miller were distinguishable from those of Kentucky Utilities, 50 T.C.M. 81,431 at 1567, the court did not
specify what distinguished Hills and iMiller from Kentucky Utilities. The Tax Court's opinion
concluded:
We discern virtually no distinction between the operative facts or legal issues
in this case and Hills. Accordingly, we conclude that Kentucky Utilities is distinguishable for the same reasons it was distinguishable in Hills. . . . It is our view
that Kentucky Utilities is not "squarely in point,"

. . .

Id. at 1567.
16 A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially heard the case, but did not issue an opinion. 733 F.2d at 400. Instead, the panel
suggested and initiated a hearing en banc. Id. at 400 n.1.
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the taxpayer failed to claim available insurance proceeds, even
though claiming those proceeds would jeopardize the taxpayer's
continued insurance coverage.1 7 The court of appeals, however,
could not significantly distinguish the issue presented in Miller from
that presented in Kentucky Utilities.'8 Consequently, to the extent
that Kentucky Utilities held that a voluntary election not to file an
insurance claim for a loss precluded the insured-taxpayer from deducting the loss under sections 165(a) and 165(c)(3), the Sixth Circuit expressly overruled Kentucky Utilities and affirmed the Tax
Court's decision. 19
In Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn,20 the taxpayer-corporation
purchased a steam generator from the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Within a few months, a mechanical failure caused
$147,537.60 in damages to the generator.2 1 Kentucky Utilities had
a $200,000 insurance policy on its equipment, subject to a $10,000
deductible. 22 Based on an investigation, Kentucky Utilities concluded that since the generator was under warranty, Westinghouse
should pay the cost of repairs. 23 Rather than pursue a claim against
Westinghouse, which denied liability for the accident, Kentucky
Utilities sought indemnification from its insurer, Lloyds of
London. 24 Lloyds did not, at any time, deny liability for the cost of
repairs in excess of the $10,000 deductible. When Lloyds insisted
on a right of subrogation against Westinghouse, Kentucky Utilities
refused the insurance proceeds. 25 In a settlement agreement,
Westinghouse paid $65,550.93 of the repair costs; Lloyds paid
$37,500, relinquishing any right of subrogation; and Kentucky Utilities absorbed the remaining repair costs, deducting that amount,
$44,486.67, on its federal income tax return.2 6
The district court concluded that Kentucky Utilities could not
deduct any amount in excess of the $10,000 deductible as either a
loss under section 23(f) 2 7 or an ordinary and necessary business
17

Id. at 400.

18 Id. at 401.
19 Id. at 404.
20 250 F. Supp. 265, 270 (W.D. Ky. 1965), ajfd on this issue, 394 F.2d 631, 632 (6th Cir.
1968).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. Kentucky Utilities feared that any litigation may have adversely affected its business relationship with Westinghouse and that it might have difficulty retaining insurance on
its equipment if Lloyds had to pay the full claim in excess of the policy deductible. 394 F.2d
at 633. See note 29 infra.
26 250 F. Supp. at 270.
27 I.R.C. § 23() (1952) (I.R.C. of 1939) provided:
§ 23. Deductions from gross income.
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
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expense under section 23(a) 28 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939.29 Affirming the district court's conclusion,30 the Sixth Circuit
held that Kentucky Utilities' failure to pursue indemnification from
Lloyds barred an uninsured loss deduction for any amount exceeding the policy's $10,000 deductible. 3' In two short paragraphs,
Judge Edwards dismissed both of the taxpayer's contentions,
writing:
This record convinces us that the District Judge's quoted
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. [Kentucky Utilities']
loss over and above the $10,000 allowed by the District Judge
was not an "uninsured loss." Sam P. Wallingford Grain Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 74 F.2d 453 (10th Cir.
1934).
Nor does [Kentucky Utilities'] voluntary assumption of the
loss for the reasons found by the District Judge seem to be
or "ordinary" within the meaning of the tax
either "necessary"
32
statute.

In Miller, the court of appeals noted that judges and commen-

(f) Losses by corporations.
In the case of a corporation, losses sustained during the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
Although similar to § 165(a) of the 1954 Code, § 23(f) referred only to corporate
losses. 733 F.2d at 401 n.5. See note 2 supra.
28 I.R.C. § 23(a) (1952) (I.R.C. of 1939) provided:
§ 23. Deductions from gross income.
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.
All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business ....
Section 23(a) of the 1939 Code is similar to § 162 of the 1954 Code. I.R.C. § 162(a)
(1982) provides:
(a) In general
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. ...
29 250 F. Supp. at 270-71. The district court also made the following findings of fact:
6. For business reasons, [Kentucky Utilities] did not want any litigation brought
against Westinghouse. Moreover, because of possible difficulty in retaining insurance of this character on its equipment, [Kentucky Utilities] did not want Lloyds to
pay all of the loss except the $10,000.00 deductible under the policy.
8. [Kentucky Utilities] voluntarily assumed $34,486.67 of the cost of repairs to the
generator to protect Westinghouse from suit by Lloyds and to avoid difficulty in
obtaining insurance with Lloyds. The expenditure of $34,486.67 in this manner
does not constitute a loss or an ordinary and necessary business expense.
30 394 F.2d at 633.
31 Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on the generator
damage issue. The district court concluded that Kentucky Utilities was entitled to a deduction of $10,000 as a loss not compensated for by insurance or otherwise under I.R.C.
§ 23(f) (1952) (I.R.C. of 1939). 250 F. Supp. at 271.
32 394 F.2d at 633 (citation omitted).
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tators have interpreted Kentucky Utilities as holding that either: (i) a
taxpayer must exhaust, all reasonable prospects for insurance indemnification before claiming a "sustained loss," or (ii) the phrase
"not compensated for" in section 165(a) means "not covered by"
34
insurance. 33 The Miller court rejected both interpretations.
Initially, the court of appeals rejected the first interpretation
that a taxpayer only sustains a loss after exhausting all reasonable
prospects for insurance recovery because it renders the clause "not
compensated by" in section 165(a) "mere surplusage." 35 The plain
language of section 165(a), allowing a deduction for "any loss sustained . . . and not compensated for by insurance," supports the
proposition that a taxpayer must determine the timing of a loss
transaction independent of the insurance consequences. 36 Furthermore, under a rule of statutory construction, courts should construe the language of a statute to avoid making any word
superfluous. 3 7 The court of appeals reasoned that to define a sustained loss with reference to potential indemnification by an insurer
would render the compensation language of section 165(a) meaningless. 38 Any time a taxpayer sustained a loss, that loss, by definition, would not be "compensated for by insurance." 3 9 Because the
parties stipulated that at the time of the deduction the taxpayer did
not have a reasonable prospect of further recovery from his friend,
the court concluded that the taxpayer sustained a loss in a "closed
4
transaction" 40 during the taxable year. '
The court rejected the second interpretation which equates the
terms "compensated for by" and "covered by," focusing on the
plain language of section 165, its legislative history, and public policy. 4 2 The court noted that "compensated" is a word distinct from
"covered." 4 3 Furthermore, the legislative history of section 165,
although scant, supports the conclusion that "not compensated for
33

733 F.2d at 402.

34

Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. See Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1093 (6th Cir. 1983).
38 733 F.2d at 402.
39 Id.
40 In Miller, the court described the "closed trarisaction" doctrine as a timing principle
that also requires that the taxpayer ascertain the gain or loss from a particular transaction
before recognizing the transaction's tax consequences. 733 F.2d at 403 n.8. See Burnet v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). According to the Miller court, the same principle applies to
casualty loss deductions-as long as a reasonable expectation of recovery from the wrongdoer exists, the taxpayer cannot ascertain the loss; consequently, the taxpayer has not yet
sustained a loss. 733 F.2d at 403 n.8.
41 Id. at 402-03.
42 Id. at 403-04.
43 Id. at 403 (citing Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1000, 1006 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
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by" does not mean "not covered by." 44 When enacting a predecessor to section 165, Congress eliminated the word "covered" from
the original House version of the bill, which would have granted a
deduction for "losses . . . not covered by insurance or otherwise
and compensated for." 45 According to the court of appeals, the
change indicates that Congress was aware of the difference between
"compensated" and "covered" and intended to enact what it in fact
enacted. Finally, to deny this distinction would prejudice taxpayers
not engaged in a trade or business, who voluntarily decline insurance indemnification for sound and practical reasons, and indirectly
benefit taxpayers who forego insurance coverage and then claim a
46
deduction for an uncompensated loss if a casualty occurs.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Contie, joined by four other
judges, agreed that the language "compensated for by insurance or
47
otherwise" does not mean "covered by insurance or otherwise."
The dissenters argued, however, that the court should deny the deduction and uphold Kentucky Utilities for three reasons. The taxpayer's voluntary choice not to file an insurance claim, which the
insurer would have paid, prevented a loss from being sustained
under section 165(a). 48 Second, the transaction was not closed and
completed. 4 9 Third, the majority's conclusion will result in preferred tax treatment for business taxpayers. 50
According to the dissenting opinion, a voluntary election not
to recover insurance proceeds prevents a casualty loss from being a
sustained loss because the election severs the causal connection between the event and the loss. 5 ' The taxpayer's election not to accept reimbursement under his insurance policy caused the alleged
52
loss-not the fire, storm, shipwreck, theft, or other casualty.
Second, since the taxpayer possessed a bona fide claim which
the insurer would have paid, the taxpayer had a reasonable pros44
45

733 F.2d at 403.
Id. Noting the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Hills, 691 F.2d at 1000, the court wrote:
The initial House Ways and Means Committee language was "losses . . . not
covered by insurance or otherwise and compensated for." The Senate Finance
Committee amended the language to its final and enacted form of "losses ... not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise."
733 F.2d at 403. Interestingly, congressional hearings discussed by the Miller court took
place in 1894. See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx
LAws, 1938-1861, at 1018 (1938). See also Comment, Theft Loss Deductions as Relieffor the
Small Investor, 1978 DUKE LJ. 849, 860-61 & nn.67-68 (discussing and citing sources for
limited legislative history of § 165(c)(3)).
46 733 F.2d at 404.
47 Id. (Contie, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 405.
49 Id. at 406-07.
50 Id. at 409.
51 Id. at 405.
52 Id. at 405-06.
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pect for recovery which Treasury Regulation section 1.165-1(b)5 3
required be exhausted under the closed and completed transaction
doctrine 54 before the taxpayer could deduct the loss.5 5 In an effort
to harmonize its holding with the closed transaction doctrine, the
majority relied on Alison v. United States,56 noting that the taxpayer
need only have exhausted reasonable prospects of recovery from
the wrongdoer and not from third party insurers. 57 But the dissenters observed that the Alison Court was not asked to decide, and did
not decide, whether exhaustion of reasonable prospects of recovery
alone satisfies the closed transaction requirement. 58 The dissenting
opinion also cited several decisions requiring exhaustion of reasonable prospects of recovery without distinguishing between wrongdoers and third parties such as insurers.5 9 Consequently, the
dissenters concluded that the majority improperly limited the scope
60
of the exhaustion rule.
Finally, the disparate practical effect of the majority's opinion
53 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1984) provides:
Nature of loss available. To be allowable as a deduction under section 165(a),
a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and, except as otherwise provided in section 165(h) and § 1.165-11,
relating to disaster losses, actually sustained during the taxable year. Only a bona
fide loss is allowable. Substance and not mere form shall govern in determining a
deductible loss.
54 See note 40 supra. The Treasury Department codified the closed transaction doctrine
in Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1984), which provides:
If a casualty or other event occurs which may result in a loss and, in the year of
such casualty or event, there exists a claim for reimbursement with respect to
which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, no portion of the loss with respect to which reimbursement may be received is sustained, for purposes of section 165, until it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether or not such
reimbursement will be received. Whether a reasonable prospect of recovery exists
with respect to a claim for reimbursement of a loss is a question of fact to be
determined upon an examination of all facts and circumstances. Whether or not
such reimbursement will be received may be ascertained with reasonable certainty,
for example, by a settlement of the claim, by an adjudication of the claim, or by an
abandonment of the claim. When a taxpayer claims that the taxable year in which
a loss is sustained is fixed by his abandonment of the claim for reimbursement, he
must be able to produce objective evidence of his having abandoned the claim,
such as the execution of a release.
55 733 F.2d at 407.
56 344 U.S. 167 (1952). InAlison, the Supreme Court allowed a deduction for embezzlement losses for the year the taxpayer discovered the embezzlement scheme and ascertained the amount of the losses. Since the taxpayer recovered a substantial portion of the
embezzled funds 10 years after the first embezzlement occurred, the Supreme Court reasoned that the taxpayer did not "sustain" the loss at the time the embezzlement occurred.
57 733 F.2d at 402-03, 407.
58 Id. at 407.
59 See, e.g., United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1927);
Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1959); Commissioner v.
Harwick, 184 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1950); Ramsay Scarlett & Co., 61 T.C. 795, 807 (1974),
aff'd, 521 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1975).
60 733 F.2d at 407.
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on business and individual taxpayers "deeply troubled" the dissenters. 6 ' The majority's opinion allows corporations and individuals
engaged in a trade or business or transactions entered into for
profit to "double-dip" by deducting both their insurance premiums
62
and their insured but unreimbursed casualty losses.
II.

Impact of Miller

The Miller decision expressly overrules Kentucky Utilities,6 3 a sixteen year old decision, which has been described as "the genesis of
the theory that a taxpayer may not elect to forego an insurance
claim and deduct his loss under Section 165."64 Both court decisions and administrative rulings have relied on Kentucky Utilities to
support the Commissioner's position that a taxpayer may not deduct, under section 165, a loss for which the taxpayer failed to claim
available insurance proceeds. 65 In two early decisions, the Tax
Court denied a casualty loss deduction while reserving the question
of the proper meaning of section 165(a)'s language "not compen67
sated for by insurance or otherwise." 66 In Axelrod v. Commissioner,
two separate concurring opinions discussed the issue but reached
opposite conclusions. 6 8 Judge Fay concluded that section 165 provides a deduction for insured but unrecovered casualty losses
where the taxpayer, for valid business reasons, relinquishes his
right to claim reimbursement from the insurance coverage. 69 Judge
Fay criticized Kentucky Utilities, writing:
In my view [Kentucky Utilities] is distinguishable from the instant
one and, in any event, in light of the very brief treatment of the
issue 70
therein should not preclude a fresh consideration of this
issue.
Judge Quealy's opinion in Axelrod relied heavily on Kentucky Utilities
in concluding that the failure to file an insurance claim for losses,
61
62
63

Id. at 409.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.

64

Summers, Loss Deductions: The Effect of Failure to File an Insurance Claim After Hills, 61

275, 276 (1983).
65 See notes 66-77 infra and accompanying text.
66 See Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248, 256 (1971) (court disallowed the casualty
loss deduction because taxpayer could not substantiate the casualty loss); Cramer v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1125, 1133 (1971) (court did not reach issue because taxpayer had not
otherwise shown that § 165 entitled her to casualty loss deduction). See also James Hallis,
47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,450 (1978) (court denied deduction because taxpayers completely
failed to carry their burden of proof).
67 56 T.C. 248 (1971).
68 56 T.C. 248, 259 (1971) (Fay, J., concurring); 56 T.C. 248, 260 (Quealy, J.,
concurring).
69 56 T.C. at 260. Two other judges joined Judge Fay's concurring opinion.
70 Id. at 259.
TAXEs
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admittedly covered by a valid insurance policy, barred a deduction
for such losses under section 165. 7 1 Judge Quealy reasoned:
Any economic disadvantage which petitioner may have sustained was not as a result of any casualty loss not being compensated for by insurance but rather was as a result of his choosing
the funds available in compensation for any casunot to accept
72
alty loss.

Two district courts followed Kentucky Utilities and Judge
Quealy's concurring opinion with little discussion. 7 3 In Bartlett v.

United States,74 and Waxer Towing Co. v. United States,75 the courts denied loss deductions to taxpayers that elected not to file insurance
claims. Relying on these decisions, the IRS continued the trend in
Revenue Ruling 78-141.76 Similarly, the Tax Court followed Ken77
tucky Utilities in a memorandum decision.

71 Id. at 262. Four other judges joined Judge Quealy's opinion.
72 Id. at 261.
73 See, e.g., Waxier Towing Co. v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Tenn. 1980);
Bartlett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975).
74 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975). In Bartlett, the taxpayers' son wrecked the taxpayers' car, causing $1,725 damage. Although the taxpayers owned a collision insurance policy
containing a $100 deductible, they elected not to file a claim to recover the loss but deducted the loss on their income tax return. The IRS denied the deduction. The district
court held that the taxpayers could only deduct the portion of the loss, exceeding § 165(c)'s
$100 floor, which the insurance company would not have paid. Id. at 221. The Bartlett
court relied heavily upon Kentucky Utilities.
75 510 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Tenn. 1980). In Waxier Towing, a collision damaged the
taxpayer's barge. Although the taxpayer had purchased an insurance policy covering the
damage, the taxpayer did not file a claim under its insurance policy but paid for the repairs
itself and deducted the repair costs on its income tax return. The Commissioner denied the
deduction. The taxpayer filed an action for refund of the taxes paid, claiming that either
§ 165(a) or § 162(a) justified the deduction. The taxpayer contended it had a valid and
compelling business reason for not filing a claim because the taxpayer's business involved
the transportation of highly flammable and explosive cargoes and industry-wide regulations
prohibited operating without insurance. The taxpayer's past liability and accident experience had been so poor that its previous underwriters refused to renew its coverage. The
taxpayer obtained new insurance, on a limited or trial basis, at a substantial premium. The
taxpayer's insurance agent advised against filing a claim because a claim would jeopardize
the taxpayer's coverage or increase the taxpayer's premiums about 150%o. Since the taxpayer could repair the damage for less than the increase in premiums for only one year, the
taxpayer decided to pay for the claims itself and did not file an insurance claim. The district
court followed Kentucky Utilities and Bartlett on the § 165 issue. The court held, however,
that the taxpayer raised material questions of fact as to whether the repair costs constituted
ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162 sufficient to withstand the IRS's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 300.
76 Rev. Rul. 78-141, 1978-1 C.B. 58, concluded that an attorney who made a payment
to a client to reimburse the client for expenses incurred as a result of erroneous advice but
did not file a claim against his malpractice insurance carrier, could not deduct the payment
as a loss under § 165 or as an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162. The
attorney did not file an insurance claim because the attorney feared that filing such a claim
might cause a premium increase or cancellation of the policy. In its § 165 discussion, the
IRS relied on Bartlett v. United States, which in turn relied heavily on Kentucky Utilities
Co. v. Glenn. The § 162 analysis also relied heavily on Kentucky Utilities.
77 See F. Tyler Morgan, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,116 (1978).
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Then, in Hills v. Commissioner,78 the Tax Court abruptly declined to follow Kentucky Utilities.7 9 In attempting to distinguish
rather than reject the holding of Kentucky Utilities,so the court, nevertheless, criticized the rationale of Kentucky Utilities stating:
The Circuit Court's opinion states that "[Kentucky Utilities']
loss over and above the $10,000 allowed by the District Judge
was not an 'uninsured loss.' " The term "uninsured loss" is not
contained in sec. 165(a) or in the cited case, Sam P. Walling/ord
Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1934) ...
An uninsured loss would clearly be commensurate with a loss
that was not "covered by8 insurance," but that is not the statutory language before us. '
In the decision, which the entire Tax Court reviewed, the court
held that section 165(a) entitled the taxpayers to a theft loss deduction because their loss was not "compensated for by insurance,"
even though the taxpayers voluntarily failed to file a claim for reimbursement with their insurance company.8 2 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Hills v.
Commisioner8 3 and adopted a strict statutory interpretation of the
"not compensated" language of section 165(a). In an opinion similar to Miller, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "compensated"
8' 4
does not mean "covered."
III.

Conclusion

In Miller, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit literally
interpreted the "not compensated for" language of section 165(a)
and refused to equate that phrase with "not covered by." Even the
dissenting judges agreed that "not compensated for" does not
mean "not covered by." Through its interpretation of section 165,
the court of appeals overruled Kentucky Utilities and its progeny,
changing the law regarding the deductibility of casualty losses
under section 165(a). As authority for interpreting the "not compensated for" language of section 165(a), Miller, arguably, could
78 76 T.C. 484 (1981). In Hills, a thief burglarized the taxpayers' vacation home causing a $760 loss. Although the taxpayers owned an insurance policy covering losses from
vandalism, malicious mischief, and theft, the taxpayers chose not to file a claim under the
policy. The taxpayers had previously filed three other theft claims and apparently feared
the insurance company would cancel their policy, including their fire insurance coverage, if
they filed a fourth claim. Since the vacation home was in a rural mountain area that did not
have a nearby fire station, the taxpayers feared any cancellation would only dissuade insurance companies from providing fire insurance for their home.
79 Id. at 489.
80 76 T.C. at 490.
81 Id. at 490 n.7.
82 Id. at 491-92.
83 691 F.2d 997.
84 Id. at 1006.
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also be considered persuasive authority for interpreting other
I.R.C. sections employing the "not compensated" language at issue
in Miller.85
By overruling Kentucky Utilities, Miller may deliver the death
blow to the Commissioner's position that a taxpayer who foregoes
an insurance claim may not deduct the loss under section 165. In
both Hills and Miller, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer who voluntarily elected not to file an insurance claim could still claim a casualty or theft deduction. 86 The Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits, the
only circuits that have specifically considered the question, have affirmed the Tax Court's decisions.8 7 Arguably, no case law currently
supports the Commissioner's position. The only cases that have
done so have heavily relied on Kentucky Utilities.88 By overruling
Kentucky Utilities, the Sixth Circuit, in effect, overruled those cases as
well.
The immediate benefit of Miller will inure to corporations and
individuals engaged in a trade or business or transactions entered
into for profit by allowing those taxpayers to deduct both their insurance premiums and their unreimbursed losses. As a result of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 89
the Miller decision will not directly benefit most individual taxpayers. TEFRA amended section 16590 by changing section
165(c)(3) 9 1 and adding section 165(h), 92 which allows an individual
to claim a theft or casualty loss as described in section 165(c)(3)
85 Thus, Miller could serve as persuasive authority for interpreting I.R.C. § 213, which
employs the same "not compensated" language.
86 See notes 15, 78-82, supra and accompanying text.
87 See notes 19, 83-84, supra and accompanying text.
88 See notes 73-75, 77, supra and accompanying text.
89 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
90 Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 203(a) and (b), 96 Stat. 324, 422 (1982).
91 As a result of TEFRA, I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1982) now provides:
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses of property not connected
with a trade or business, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft.
92 I.R.C. § 165(h)(1) (1982) provides:
(h) Casualty and theft losses
(1) General rule
Any loss of an individual described in subsection (c)(3) shall be allowed for
any taxable year only to the extent that(A) the amount of loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or from
each theft, exceeds $100, and
(B) the aggregate amount of all such losses sustained by such individual during the taxable year (determined after application of subparagraph (A)) exceeds 10
percent of the adjusted gross income of the individual.
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only to the extent that: (1) the amount of loss arising from each
casualty or theft exceeds $100, and (2) the total amount of the individual's theft and casualty losses during the taxable year exceeds
ten percent of the individual's adjusted gross income after applying
the $100 limitation to each casualty or theft loss. Consequently,
although Miller potentially benefits taxpayers who own insurance,
most individuals not engaged in a trade or business or transactions
entered into for profit cannot deduct their unreimbursed casualty
losses. Nevertheless, Miller represents a significant defeat for the
Internal Revenue Service.
Matthew J. Barrett
Stephen J. Dunn
Robert H. Kurnick, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOORE V U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: A POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF CONGRESSMEN'S STANDING TO SUE

In Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives,I the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the question of whether individual congressmen have standing to sue the
Congress. In Moore, members of the House of Representatives
sought declaratory relief to invalidate the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 2 The congressmen contended
that TEFRA originated in the Senate in violation of the origination
clause of the United States Constitution, 3 which requires that bills
for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately denied relief
on the basis of prudential considerations, 4 it held, significantly, that
the congressmen had standing to bring suit in federal court. 5 Thus,
the Moore court determined that the federal court had jurisdiction
over the controversy but that, because of prudential concerns, that
power should not be exercised.
Part I of this comment outlines the facts and holding of Moore.
Part II examines the standing analysis which the court employed
and concludes that the Moore court's finding of standing does not
comport with traditional tests for standing. Finally, Part III discusses the court's decision to deny relief based on prudential considerations. This comment concludes that, contrary to the Moore
holding, denial of relief should have been the consequence of constitutional command rather than judicial discretion.
I.

Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives

In December 1981, the House of Representatives approved
H.R. 4961, a bill which would amend the Internal Revenue Code to
reduce tax revenues. 6 The Senate substantially amended the bill
and renamed it "The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982" (TEFRA). As amended, the bill, rather than reducing tax
revenues, proposed to significantly increase tax revenues. This
change prompted Representative Rousselot, one of the plaintiffs in
Moore, to propose a resolution in the House stating that the Sen1 733 F.2d 946, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert.
filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1984) (No. 84-389).
2 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
4 733 F.2d at 956.
5 Id.
6 H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9607-10 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
1981).
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ate's amendments violated the origination clause of the Constitution. 7 The House voted to table Rousselot's resolution. 8 Each of
the plaintiffs, eighteen members of the 97th Congress, voted
against the motion to table. 9 The House then voted to send the bill
to a Senate conference without first referring it back to the House
Committee on Ways and Means. Again, the plaintiffs were outvoted.10 In August 1982, TEFRA passed both the House and Sen2
ate;" all plaintiffs voted against its passage.'
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court against the
House, the Senate, and certain officers of both bodies,' 3 seeking a
declaratory judgment that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in
the Senate in violation of the origination clause. The district court
dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
and alternatively, that in the court's remedial discretion, declaratory relief should be withheld.' 4 The court of appeals affirmed,
agreeing with the district court's dismissal based upon prudential
concerns. Significantly, however, the court of appeals held that the
legislators had standing to sue in federal court.' 5
7 H.R. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4776 (daily ed. July 28,
1982). The resolution provides:
Resolved, that the Senate Amendments to the bill, H.R. 4961, in the opinion of the
House, contravene the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the
Constitution of the United States, and are an infringement of the privileges of this
House and that the said bill, with amendments be respectfully returned to the Senate with a message communicating this resolution.
8 Id. at H4776-77. A vote to table a resolution results in suspending consideration of
the resolution.
9 The plaintiffs were:
Laurence E. Craig, R-ID
Edward Bethune, R-AR
Philip M. Crane, R-IL
Daniel B. Crane, R-IL
Carroll Hubbard, Jr., D-KY
Billy Lee Evans, D-GA
Elliot H. Levitas, D-GA
James Jeffries, R-KS
Lawrence P. McDonald, D-GA
James G. Martin, R-NC
Stephen L. Neal, D-NC
W. Henson Moore, R-LA
John H. Rousselot, R-CA
Ron Paul, R-TX
Richard T. Schulze, R-PA
James D. Santini, D-NV
Bob Stump, D-AZ
Richard C. Shelby, D-AL
Telephone conversation with the clerk's office of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (September 18, 1984).
10 H.R. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4786-87 (daily ed. July 28,
1982).
11 H.R. Con. Res. 398, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S10946, H6635-36 (daily
ed. July 28, 1982).
12 Id. at H6635-36.
13 Named as co-defendants in the suit were: Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., the Speaker of the
House; George Bush, the President of the Senate; Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., the Clerk of
the House; and William F. Hildenbrand, the Secretary of the Senate. Moore, 733 F.2d at
948.
14 Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267, 271 (1982).
15 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
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II.

The Moore Court's Standing Analysis

In determining that the congressmen had standing, the Moore
court applied the four pronged test which the Supreme Court announced in Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc. 16 Under Valley Forge, a plaintiff has
standing when: (a) "he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant;"' 7 (b) his injury falls within the "zone of interests" protected by the constitutional provision allegedly violated;' 8 (c) the
injury "can be traced to the challenged action" of the defendant;' 9
and (d) the injury is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision"
of the court. 20 The Valley Forge Court recognized the complexity of
standing, noting that "the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition." 2' The Court, however, declared, "of one thing we may be sure: those who do not possess
Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the
United States." 2 2 Thus, if the plaintiff lacks standing, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution.
In addressing the first prong of the Valley Forge analysis, the
court of appeals concluded that the congressional plaintiffs had alleged a "specific injury in fact to a cognizable legal interest." 2 3 The
court, however, recognized that suits brought by congressmen
against coordinate branches of government present separation of
24
powers concerns which may affect standing in the federal courts.
Therefore, the court required that the representatives' alleged in25
jury be "specific and cognizable" in order to give rise to standing.
The court ruled that denial of the opportunity to debate and vote
on the origination of legislation, in a manner prescribed by the
Constitution, inflicted a "specific and concrete" injury on the
26
plaintiffs.
Although the Moore court included separation of powers concerns as a factor in its search for a specific injury in fact to each
16
17

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99

(1979)).
18 Id. at 475.
19 Id. at 472 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).

20 Id.
21
22
23
24

Id. at 475.
Id. at 475-76.
Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
Id.

25 Id.
26

Id. at 952.
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plaintiff, the court emphasized that standing and the political question doctrine are distinct tenets. 27 Specifically, the court cautioned
against an encroachment into standing analysis by political question concerns. The court warned that such an intrusion would
"greatly curtail the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over mat28
ters that touch upon a coordinate branch of government."
The court of appeals readily disposed of the remaining prongs
of the standing test. In addressing the second prong, the court relied on its previous holdings that congressmen have standing to sue
to assert violations of constitutionally prescribed procedure. 29 The
Moore court concluded that an individual congressman's right to initiate legislation is within the "zone of interests" protected by the
30
origination clause.
The Moore court determined that the congressional plaintiffs
satisfied the third prong of the Valley Forge test because the injury
was "traceable to the challenged actions of the defendants." 3 1 The
plaintiffs' alleged injury, the unconstitutional denial of the chance
to debate and vote on the origination of TEFRA, occurred exclusively within the legislative branch. Both the House and Senate enacted the disputed legislation. Thus, according to the court, the
alleged injury was traceable to the defendants' actions. Finally, the
Moore court held that the court's power to grant declaratory and
injunctive relief provided sufficient capacity to redress the claimed
32
injury, thereby satisfying the fourth prong of the Valley Forge test.
Moore's holding that the representatives had standing to sue the
Congress may provide congressmen greater accessibility to the federal courts. 33 But, the court's decision to address a dispute con27

Id. at 953.

28 Id.
29 The court refers to Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
30 The "zone of interests" requirement, as its language suggests, is intended to be generously applied. The requirement seeks primarily to eliminate from adjudication cases in
which the connection between the purpose of the protection and the interest asserted is too
tenuous to justify judicial determination on that basis. Therefore, "the challenging party
need only show that it is an intended beneficiary of the statute and not necessarily the
primary one." Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
31 Moore, 733 F.2d at 954.
32 Redressability has been characterized as "the connection between the alleged injury
and the action requested of the court." Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239,
1248 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Further, the requirement is not that the injury will certainly be
redressed but rather that it "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 472 (1981) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
33 For purposes of standing analysis, the court assumes the validity of the plaintiffs
claim and, without addressing the merits, construes the complaint in the plaintiffs favor.
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Thus, the holding in Moore is not limited to
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fined to the legislative branch, brought by lawmakers who debated
and voted on the contested legislation, may circumvent the requirement that a plaintiff suffer a specific injury in fact. For example, in
Moore, each plaintiff alleged a violation of his constitutional right to
participate as a representative of the House in the origination of revenue raising legislation.3 4 Yet, Congress settled this dispute to the
satisfaction of a majority of its members in a manner consistent with
its established procedures.3 5 Furthermore, the Moore court recognized that suits brought by congressional plaintiffs against a branch
of the government "pose separation-of-powers concerns which may
affect a complainant's standing." 36 Perhaps this concern should be
emphasized when an individual congressman alleges an injury to
his office although the Congress finds no harm.3 7 As noted in the
concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,3 8 "[w]here Congress itthe enactment of legislation in violation of the origination clause. Rather, the court required an injury to an "interest positively identified by the Constitution." Moore, 733 F.2d
at 95 1. As noted in the concurring opinion, the courts, following Moore, could resolve disputes between legislators concerning any constitutional provision that regulates legislative
procedures. Id. at 958. For example, article I, section 5, clause 4 of the Constitution provides that "[n]either House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days." And article I, section 4, clause 4 states that
"[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate." Moore permits
a congressional plaintiff to allege a personal injury resulting from violation of either provision and have standing to sue the Congress in the federal courts.
34 Although the plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the opportunity to participate
in the origination of TEFRA, the legislative history casts some doubt on their claim. First,
H.R. 4961, although substantially altered by the Senate, did in fact originate in the House
and was passed by the House on December 15, 1981. H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127
CONG. REC. H9607-10 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981). TEFRA retained the House number in the
Senate. Second, the plaintiffs voted against the motion to table Representative Rousselot's
resolution, which alleged that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in the Senate. They
voted against the motion to send TEFRA to Senate conference, and they voted against
enacting TEFRA as legislation. See notes 8, 10, 12 supra. The district court noted: "Plaintiffs fully participated in the legislative process which culminated in the passage of the act
they now challenge. They were simply outvoted." Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 270.
35 On July 28, 1982, the House voted to table Representative Rousselot's resolution,
which alleged that TEFRA unconstitutionally originated in the Senate. H.R. Res. 541, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4776-77 (daily ed. July 28, 1982). Also on July 28, the
House voted to send TEFRA to conference with the Senate, after debate on the constitutionality of the Senate's amendments to TEFRA. Id. at H4777-88. Finally, TEFRA passed
both houses on August 19, 1982. H.R. Con. Res. 541, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. S10946, H6635-36 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982).
36 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
37 The concurring opinion, disagreeing with the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
had standing, noted:
[W]e sit here neither to supervise the internal workings of the executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding their
respective powers. Unless and until those internal workings . . . brings forth a
result that harms private rights, it is no part of our constitutional province, which
is "solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."
Id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)).
38 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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self, and not the Executive, renders an individual legislator's vote
39
ineffective, the courts have no role."
Although the Moore court focused considerable attention on
whether the plaintiffs had sustained "injury in fact," 40 the court
rather summarily disposed of the other Valley Forge criteria, 4 1 including the zone of interests analysis. 4 2 The court's disposition of
this latter criterion may prove to be the most significant aspect of
Moore in future litigation. Injury in fact analysis involves a determination that concrete harm has occurred. 43 Therefore, the nature of
the inquiry is factual and necessarily dependent on the circumstances of the particular case. That the injury is within the zone of
interests protected by the Constitution, on the other hand, looks to
the nature of that injury. In finding that a particular type of injury
is protected, the court directly adjusts the constitutional limits to its
jurisdiction. Thus, by expressly stating that the "interests of individual legislators were within the zone of interests protected by
constitutional provisions," 44 the Court of Appeals for the District of
45
Columbia Circuit has expanded congressional standing.
Though the nature of the injury protected in Moore may prove
crucial in future litigation, the court did not delineate which of the
plaintiffs' specific interests the Senate may have violated by allegedly originating TEFRA. Prior congressional standing cases enumerate three basic interests that congressmen have in a
constitutionally prescribed procedure: the interest of congressmen
39 Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 712 (Wright, J., concurring).
40 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
41 Id. at 953-54.
42 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. As noted earlier, see note 30 supra, the zone of interests
requirement has received generous application. But, the requirement has remained essential to the analysis, preventing standing where the interest asserted is either so common to
people generally or so indirectly the result of constitutional infringement that the injury
could not serve as a basis ofjudicial precedent. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
43 Moore, 733 F.2d at 951.
44 Id. at 953-54.
45 Both Goldwater, 617 F.2d 697, and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974), upon which the court relies to establish a zone of interest, see Moore, 733 F.2d at 954
n.36, involved controversies between separate branches of government. Moore is distinguishable. MVoore presents an action by congressmen against the Congress; therefore, the
case does not involve the necessities for judicial determination reflected in the previous
decisions. In Moore, alternative means of redress were available within the Congress itself.
Congress as a body recognized the possible deviation from congressional priority but voted
to table Representative Rousselot's resolution. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 949. Thus, without
expressly saying so, the court has asserted jurisdiction beyond the precedential basis.
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444
U.S. 996 (1979), involved a suit by members of Congress challenging the President's unilateral termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan allegedly in violation of the treaty's
provisions.
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), involved a suit by Senator Kennedy challenging an alleged "pocket veto" of S. 3418 in violation of article I, section 7 of
the Constitution.
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as representatives of individual citizens; the interest of congressmen as representatives of Congress as an institution; and the individual interests of congressmen as private plaintiffs asserting
personal rights. Apparently, the last of these interests is the injury
which the Moore court found.
One of the interests that the origination clause 46 protects is the
right of citizens to have taxing authority restricted by the powers of
popular vote. 47 Neither the district court4 nor the court of appeals 49 denied that private plaintiffs would have standing to challenge TEFRA. In this respect, the congressmen may have been
acting as representatives of the people. Prior to Moore, however,
courts relied on prudential considerations to deny representative
plaintiffs standing to sue. 50 Recognizing the risks of insufficient
representation of the third party's interest and the possibility that
the third party may not want the suit litigated, courts have required
the plaintiff to show an independent basis for asserting standing to
sue. -5 1 This independent basis is usually concrete personal injury to
the plaintiff. Therefore, a congressman's status as representative of
the people alone should not be enough to establish standing.
Though the injury to the public is within the constitutionally protected zone of interest, an individual congressman may not assert
the public interest without personal injury.
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
47 The origination clause derived from the fear of delegates of the larger states at the
Constitutional Convention that if revenue raising power were placed in the Senate, the
smaller states, because of equal representation, would have disproportionate control of the
purse strings. The theory behind the clause is that national taxing authority should be
placed in the legislative branch which is more responsive to popular opinion. The House of
Representatives satisfied this goal in two respects. First, the House was selected more often
and therefore more sensitive to public influence. Second, the House provided a better
forum for debate-members were both more numerous and more representative of national popular vote. But, in the bargaining and compromise of the convention, the Senate
was given almost unlimited power to amend or reject revenue bills. Therefore, the power
remaining in the House over revenue bills consisted solely in their origination. Many argue
that their power is still significant in that it effectively gives the House the power to "set the
legislative agenda." That is, by originating revenue bills, the House effectively controls the
structure and direction of legislative debate. See, Comment, The OriginationClause, the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Role of the Judiciaiy, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 419
(1983). See generally C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928).
48 Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 271-72.
49 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
50 "[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (involving taxpayer
standing).
51 See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Harrington
court recognized this approach to standing as "derivative" and in regard to asserting such a
claim recognized that "it may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum
requirements of Art. III ....
553 F.2d at 199 n.41 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 504-05 (1975)).
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A second possible basis for standing in Moore is that violation
of the origination clause injured the Congress as an institution and
thereby injured the congressional plaintiffs as members of that institution. 52 Arguably, Congress is an intended beneficiary of the
origination clause, 5 3 but the Congress elected not to enforce its
right to strike down TEFRA. 54 Thus, this justification is also without merit.
Therefore, it appears that the court's decision was substantially
based on personal injury to the congressmen. As previously discussed, however, it is difficult to conceptualize how this harm is
within the zone of interests protected by the origination clause. As
Judge Scalia argued in his concurring opinion, "the authority
[under the origination clause] was conferred for the benefit not of
the governors but the governed."5 5 Thus, Moore's holding that the
harm is within the zone of interests protected by the origination
clause will create an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion
of federal jurisdiction in suits brought by congressmen.
III.

The Moore Court's Remedial Discretion Analysis

Although the Moore court found that the congressional plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of TEFRA, it
nevertheless chose to abstain from awarding declaratory relief to
the congressmen. 5 6 The basis of the court's abstention was the
doctrine of remedial discretion.5 7 The court indicated that "when a
congressional plaintiff's dispute is primarily with other members of
Congress and when private plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the doctrine of remedial discretion counsels judicial restraint in affording the
congressional plaintiff declaratory or injunctive relief.' ' 5 8 This
comment concludes, as noted earlier, that the congressional plaintiffs in Moore lacked standing. A proper review of the use of equitable discretion, however, must proceed under the assumption that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue the Congress.
The Moore court's use of equitable discretion to abstain from
awarding declaratory relief is significant because it will hinder congressional plaintiffs in seeking a remedy for their violated rights. In
52 At a minimum, Congress has an interest in the origination clause inasmuch as the
clause promotes an orderly process for legislating revenue bills.
53 Plaintiffs also asserted injury as members of the House Ways and Means Committee.
The Constitution, however, provides no specific protection for this committee as a body
and protest must be on other grounds.
54 See Moore, 733 F.2d at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55 Id.
56 Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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using the equitable discretion doctrine, the Moore court followed its
decision in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee 59 and its subsequent related decisions in Vanderjagt v. O'Neill 60 and Crockett v. Reagan. 61 In Riegle, VanderJagt, and Crockett, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that when legislative remedies are available to a congressional plaintiff, the court must dismiss the case on the basis of
prudential concerns. 6 2 Thus, because the Moore court found that
the plaintiffs could vindicate their rights through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of TEFRA,63 it affirmed dismissal of the case
on the basis of prudential concerns. The Moore court, however,
overstated the availability of such a remedy. To obtain legislative
redress, congressional plaintiffs must persuade the majority of their
colleagues to amend or repeal the bill at issue. This task is almost
insurmountable since congressional plaintiffs typically represent a
small minority of all the congressmen. Because legislative redress
is likely to be unsuccessful for the congressional plaintiffs, they are
left with a violated right and no remedy. The law of equity was
created to avoid such a situation, not produce it.64
The standards to employ in determining whether to abstain, on
the basis of equitable discretion, in a congressional plaintiff case
were first set forth in Riegle. 65 The Riegle court developed a twoprong standard, holding that when (1) the congressional plaintiffs
can attain legislative redress, and (2) a private plaintiff may bring a
similar action, prudential concerns counsel for dismissal of the con66
gressional plaintiffs' action.
In analyzing the subsequent application of the Riegle standards,
it is apparent that the District of Columbia Circuit has failed to consistently apply such standards. VanderJagtand Moore exemplify this
inconsistency. In VanderJagt, fourteen Republican members of the
House of Representatives sued the Democratic leaders of the
House. The Republican members contended that the Democrats
had systematically discriminated against them by providing them
with fewer seats on House committees and subcommittees than
they were proportionally due. 6 7 The court dismissed the entire
case despite the fact that the Republicans had sued in their individual capacities as voters. 68 In noting the court's inconsistency with
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1983).
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 962 n.9 (Scalia, J., concurring).
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
Id. at 882.
699 F.2d at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
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Riegle, Judge Bork, in his concurring opinion in Vander Jagt,
indicated:
If they were applying Riegle, my colleagues would dismiss the
action by plaintiffs in their capacities as legislators because legislative redress is available and a similar action could be brought
by a private plaintiff. But they could not dismiss the entire action since there are private plaintiffs before us: the congressmen also sued in their capacities as voters and as representatives
of the classes of all voters represented in the House by
Republicans .69
Rather than rely on the principled rationale of Riegle, the VanderJagt
court withheld declaratory relief due to "the startlingly unattractive" idea of telling the Speaker of the House of Representatives
what he must do to comply with the Constitution.7 0 Such a rationale lacks the "general applicability" which Judge McGowan argued
was necessary to properly use equitable discretion. 7'
Moore continues the inconsistent application of the equitable
discretion doctrine. In Moore, the court indicated it could withhold
"declaratory relief regardless of the availability of other forms of
relief." 72 This approach varies from that outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris73 where the Court stated
that "courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
74
if denied equitable relief."
Although the majority in Moore indicated that the congressional
plaintiffs did have other available judicial remedies, the court did
not elaborate. 7 5 Whatever adequate remedies at law the congressional plaintiffs may have had in Moore were denied when the court
dismissed the case. Furthermore, given the substantial barriers to
legislative redress, it is apparent that the plaintiffs have suffered ir69 Id. at 1183 (Bork, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 1176.
71 See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintifls, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 251 (1981).
McGowan contends that the standing doctrine is difficult to apply in congressional plaintiff
cases due to the doctrine's inability to reflect separation of powers concerns that are inherent in such cases. He argues that the political question doctrine is incapable of resolving
congressional plaintiff cases due to its inherent deceptiveness and its general disfavor
among judicial and academic authorities. He further contends that the ripeness doctrine is
inappropriate in congressional plaintiff cases because, like the standing doctrine, it fails to
consider the separation of powers concerns prevalent in congressional plaintiff cases.
Moore, 733 F.2d at 955.
72 Moore, 733 F.2d at 955.
73 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
74 Id. at 43-44.
75 Moore, 733 F.2d at 954. It should be noted thatiudge Scalia contends in his concurring opinion that the plaintiffs do not have any other available judicial relief. Id. at 962 n.9.
If so, the majority has extended the use of equitable discretion well beyond its originally
intended use.
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reparable injury because the court refused to grant declaratory relief. Thus, the Moore court failed to apply the equitable discretion
doctrine developed in Younger and later extended in Riegle to congressional plaintiff cases. The District of Columbia Circuit should
have provided clear and concise principles, capable of consistent
application, for employing equitable discretion in congressional
plaintiff cases.
IV. Conclusion
In holding that the congressmen had standing to sue in the
federal courts, the Moore court has made the federal courts more
accessible to congressional plaintiffs. By alleging an injury to the
right to debate and vote in Congress, a potential congressional
plaintiff will meet the requirement of standing and thus confer jurisdiction upon the federal court. Moore, perhaps unintentionally,
allows congressional plaintiffs to overcome the difficult jurisdictional requirement, leaving only the less difficult equitable discretion hurdle. In essence, congressmen will not have to convince the
court that it has jurisdiction. After Moore, congressmen need only
convince a court that it should exercise its jurisdiction. It appears,
however, that the Moore court circumvented the requirement that
the congressional plaintiffs suffer a concrete and specific injury
within the zone of interests protected by the origination clause.
The court in Moore should have dismissed the case not because of
prudential concerns, but rather because the plaintiffs lacked standing, a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.
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